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The Political Economy of China’s Regulatory State:  
A Reappraisal 
Miron Mushkat* & Roda Mushkat** 
Abstract 
The revolutionary Chinese institutional order has given way to a more 
liberal governance regime, which continues to evolve. Nevertheless, as 
changing patterns of micro-economic regulation illustrate, this has not been 
a linear and straightforward process. Rather, waves of decentralization and 
recentralization have unfolded in close succession, and liberalization and 
reregulation have often been pursued simultaneously. This apparently 
unique policy configuration seems to be impinging on governance in other 
parts of the world, given that the “emerging giant” responsible for the 
“product” is increasingly acting as an active global “rule maker,” as distinct 
from a merely passive “rule taker.” Yet, it is inadequately understood and is 
subject to insufficiently critical evaluation. A detailed and probing examina-
tion of the substantial academic literature on the subject reveals lingering 
ambiguities, noticeable gaps, a significant scope for further integration of the 
various threads, and an uneven picture pointing to potentially less favorable 
lessons than commonly drawn. 
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I. Introduction 
Reflecting the conventional wisdom regarding policy initiatives 
embarked upon by aggressively reformist leaders in Anglo-Saxon 
countries, notably Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, the past 
three decades are perceived as a period characterized, for better or 
for worse, by “rolling back the frontiers of the State.”1 This is a fun-
damentally apt and largely valid portrayal, but it obscures the fact 
that the ideas and strategies that have come to shape institutional re-
alities in a genuinely large number of national settings have not been 
embraced universally and that their adoption, where it has taken 
place, has at times been a complicated and protracted undertaking.2 
Nor can it be said that the process has invariably followed an even 
path, as evidenced by reversals witnessed in the wake of the severe 
2008–09 global economic crisis, which prompted governments to re-
sort to far-reaching stabilization measures in order to offset pro-
nounced private sector frailty.3 
From the particular angle the subject is approached here, the 
deep structural transformation sought has turned out to be an unbal-
anced venture. In some key domains, progress has been sustained, 
even if not always smoothly, but this has not been the case across the 
entire policy spectrum. For example, the redistributive realm and 
public ownership are spheres of government activity where, for the 
most part, there has been no persistent and significant bidirectional, 
or multidirectional movement. The “great society” or comprehensive 
welfare State blueprint has been steadily scaled down and infused 
with utilitarian spirit.4 By the same token, despite occasional setbacks, 
the trend toward corporatization, privatization, and similar reconfig-
uration of property rights (e.g., private provision of public services) 
has not been dampened—let alone reversed5—other than perhaps se-
 
 1. See Stephen J. Bailey, Local Government Economics: Principles and Prac-
tice (2d ed. 1999); Stephen J. Bailey, Public Sector Economics: Theory, Policy, and 
Practice (2002); Stephen J. Bailey, Strategic Public Finance (2004). 
 2. See, e.g., India in the Era of Economic Reforms (Jeffrey D. Sachs et al. eds., 
1999); T.N. Srinivasan, Growth, Sustainability, and India’s Economic Reforms 
(2011). 
 3. See Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: 
Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (2009). 
 4. See Michael Moran, Review Article: Understanding the Regulatory State, 32 Brit. J. 
Pol. Sci. 391–413 (2002). 
 5. Id. 
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lectively and temporarily in the face of overwhelming pressures in-
duced by severe economic crises.6 
In addition, the more direct and inherently expansionary Keynes-
ian demand management approaches have fallen out of favor and 
their less palpable and resource intensive monetarist counterparts 
have gained ascendancy, without necessarily leading to fiscal consoli-
dation in all circumstances, because the drive to reduce the burden of 
taxation has often not been matched by a strong determination to 
curtail public expenditure.7 Supply-side strategies, firmly wedded to 
the notion that the market is a vastly superior economic coordination 
mechanism to government, have also risen to prominence.8 By con-
trast, the regulatory function has displayed a mixed pattern, combin-
ing retrenchment with growth, and shifting backward and forward in 
a manner that has featured regulation, deregulation, and reregula-
tion.9 
Creeping, perhaps even galloping, reregulation has prompted le-
gal scholars and social scientists to often approvingly invoke the con-
cept of a “regulatory State.”10 The term is relied upon to convey the 
 
 6. See Reinhart & Rogoff, supra note 3. 
 7. See Tim Congdon, Keynes, the Keynesians, and Monetarism (2007). 
 8. See Brian Domitrovic, Econoclasts: The Rebels Who Sparked the Supply-
Side Revolution and Restored American Prosperity (2009). 
 9. See Regulation, Deregulation, and Reregulation: Institutional Perspec-
tives (Claude Menard & Michael Ghertman eds., 2009) [hereinafter Institutional Perspec-
tives]. 
 10. E.g., id.; see A Reader on Regulation (Robert Baldwin et al. eds., 1998); Chris 
Berg, The Growth of Australia’s Regulatory State: Ideology, Accountability, and 
Mega-regulators (2008); Christopher Hood et al., Regulation Inside Government: 
Waste-Watchers, Quality Police, and Sleaze-Busters (1999) [hereinafter Hood et al., 
Regulation Inside Government]; Roger King, The Regulatory State in an Age of 
Governance: Soft Words and Big Sticks (2007); Barry M. Mitnick, The Political 
Economy of Regulation: Creating, Designing, and Removing Regulatory Forms 
(1980); Michael Moran, The British Regulatory State: High Modernism and Hyper 
Innovation (2003); Regulating Europe (Giandomenico Majone ed., 1996); Regulatory 
Policy and the Social Sciences (Roger G. Noll ed., 1985); Cass R. Sunstein, After the 
Rights Revolution: Re-conceiving the Regulatory State (1990); John Braithwaite, The 
New Regulatory State and the Transformation of Criminology, 40 Brit. J. Criminology 222 
(2000); Adam Crawford, Networked Governance and the Post-Regulatory State? Steering, Rowing, 
and Anchoring the Provision of Policy and Security, 10 Theoretical Criminology 449 (2006); 
Simeon Djankov et al., The New Comparative Economics, 31 J. Comp. Econ. 595 (2003); Dagmar 
Eberle, Development Paths of the Regulatory State: Comparison Between the United States and Cana-
da, 44 Pol. Q. 483 (2003); Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q.J. Econ. 
1193 (2002) [hereinafter Glaeser & Shleifer, Legal Origins]; Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei 
Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory State, 41 J. Econ. Literature 401 (2003) [hereinafter Glae-
ser & Shleifer, Regulatory State]; David Levi-Faur & Sharon Gilad, The Rise of the British Regula-
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primacy, in the current policy environment—both in the qualitative 
and quantitative sense of the word—of regulatory activity over other 
forms of government initiative, rather than merely the selective ac-
celeration in its pace.11 The corollary is that a State qualifying as reg-
ulatory in nature is one that acknowledges, where appropriate, the 
inevitability of regulation, then structures its agenda accordingly, ex-
hibits less restraint on this front than elsewhere, and places regulato-
ry endeavor at the epicenter of its strategic framework for managing 
the economy at the micro and macro level.12 
This is not just a matter of primacy or the relative emphasis given 
to different clusters of government activities. In a regulatory State, a 
functional substitution occurs when growing reliance on standard-
setting and enforcement agencies coincides with the shedding of op-
erational responsibilities for the delivery of public services by gov-
ernment departments to executive bodies that are overseen by minis-
ters or their equivalent by means of framework agreements.13 This 
elaborate, but looser than the tight top-down traditional form organ-
izational steering-and-control architecture, pattern is broadly dupli-
cated inside the public bureaucracy.14 That government institution is 
increasingly penetrated by supranational regulatory entities (e.g., the 
European Union’s administrative organs and the European Court of 
Justice, in that particular geographic context).15 
 
tory State: Transcending the Privatization Debate, 37 Comp. Pol. 105 (2004); Martin Loughlin & 
Colin Scott, The Regulatory State, in Developments in British Politics 5, 205–19 (Patrick 
Dunleavy et al. eds., 1997); Giandomenico Majone, From the Positive to the Regulatory State: 
Causes and Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance, 17 J. Pub. Pol’y 139 (1997); Gian-
domenico Majone, The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe, 17 W. Eur. Pol. 77–101 (1994) 
[hereinafter Majone, Regulatory State in Europe]; Moran, supra note 4; see also Ian Ayres & John 
Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 
(1992); Robert Baldwin & Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strat-
egy, and Practice (2d ed. 2011); Julia Black, Rules and Regulators (1997); John 
Braithwaite & Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (2000); Controlling Mod-
ern Government: Variety, Communality, and Change (Christopher Hood et al. eds., 
2004) [hereinafter Controlling Modern Government]; Global Regulation: Managing 
Crises after the Imperial Turn (Kees van der Pijl et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter Managing 
Crises]; Christopher Hood et al., The Government of Risk: Understanding Risk 
Regulation Regimes (2001); Bronwen Morgan & Karen Yeung, An Introduction to 
Law and Regulation (2007); Anthony I. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic 
Theory (2d ed. 2004). 
 11. See Levi-Faur & Gilad, supra note 10; Moran, supra note 4. 
 12. See sources cited supra note 11. 
 13. See King, supra note 10. 
 14. See Controlling Modern Government, supra note 10. 
 15. See Braithwaite & Drahos, supra note 10; King, supra note 10; Managing Crises, 
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Despite considerable decentralization and flexibility, a regulatory 
State is inevitably characterized by a proliferation of rules that, 
though a feature of rule-based governance, should be distinguished 
from regulations. The former tend to be non-discretionary measures 
of wide application in legally underpinned decision-making.16 They 
serve the purpose of providing high predictability in relations be-
tween individuals, and between individuals and the State (e.g., rules 
of the road).17 Regulations can also be said to be rule-like in that they 
are intended to guide and order human behavior. Nevertheless, such 
policy instruments commonly draw on a broader array of sources and 
are more encompassing in their incorporation of public and private 
institutional inputs.18 A wider range of actors is thus generally in-
volved and the law, in the formal sense of the term, typically plays a 
less prominent role.19 
Multiple explanations have been offered by economists, legal 
scholars, organization theorists, and political scientists for the shifts 
from regulation to deregulation and vice versa including the simulta-
neous pursuit of both strategies.20 Concepts such as “market failure,” 
“regulatory cycle,” “regulatory capture,” “regulatory cartelization,” 
“coordination costs,” “interest group alignment,” “regulatory entry,” 
“regulatory exit,” “transaction costs,” “satisficing,” “sequential deci-
sion making,” “government failure,” “backlash,” and 
“first/second/third order changes” have been effectively invoked for 
this purpose and subjected, with some success, to empirical scruti-
ny.21 It has also been argued that the scope of regulation is so broad 
and the supply and demand equation is driven by so many factors, 
that some forms of activity may encounter headwinds (e.g., the eco-
nomic type), while others may be propelled by tailwinds (e.g., the so-
 
supra note 10. 
 16. See Deborah Z. Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Or-
ganization: Legitimacy, Democracy, and Community in the International Trading 
System (2005). 
 17. See Geoffrey Brennan & James Buchanan, The Reason of Rules: Constitu-
tional Political Economy (1985). 
 18. See King, supra note 10. 
 19. Id. 
 20. For a comprehensive survey see Michael Ghertman, The Puzzle of Regulation, Deregu-
lation, and Reregulation, in Institutional Perspectives, supra note 9, at 351–73. 
 21. Id. 
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cial variant).22 Here, it is sufficient to note that the phenomenon does 
not necessarily constitute an unfathomable paradox. 
The notion of a regulatory State is a convenient and simple ab-
straction of complex and evolving reality. It does not manifest itself in 
a uniform fashion and is not associated with a well-defined and ine-
lastic set of challenges and problems. The American,23 British,24 and 
European25 versions have been portrayed along lines that do not fully 
converge. In different geographic or institutional milieus, legal schol-
ars and social scientists have chosen to focus on different dimensions 
of the policy landscape and address different opportunities or threats. 
Nevertheless, a common foundation, as outlined above, may be dis-
cerned. Moreover and inevitably, accelerating globalization has had 
the impact of blurring the significant distinctions without completely 
eliminating them.26 
The academic literature on the regulatory State is substantial in 
terms of scope, scale, and analytical rigor. Still, this is a dynamic field 
of socio-legal inquiry and a number of gaps remain. Notably, the fo-
cus has primarily been on institutional patterns in North America, 
the United Kingdom, and developed European countries. Relatively 
modest attention has been accorded to Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, 
Latin America, and South America (with the possible exception of 
Australasia27 and some other isolated cases).28 A recent and welcome 
departure from this trend is the ongoing and thorough examination 
 
 22. See Levi-Faur & Gilad, supra note 10; Moran, supra note 4. 
 23. See Sunstein, supra note 10; Eberle, supra note 10; see also Steven Kelman, Regu-
lating America, Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of Occupational Safety 
and Health Policy (1981). 
 24. See Hood et al., Regulation Inside Government, supra note 10; Moran, supra 
note 10; Levi-Faur & Gilad, supra note 10; Loughlin & Scott, supra note 10; see also David Vo-
gel, National Styles of Regulation: Environmental Policy in Great Britain and 
the United States (1986). 
 25. See, e.g., Majone, Regulatory State in Europe, supra note 10; see also Adrienne Heri-
tier, Policy-Making and Diversity in Europe: Escape from Deadlock (1999); 
Adrienne Heritier et al., Ringing the Changes in Europe: Regulatory Competition 
and the Transformation of the State: Britain, France, and Germany (1996); New 
Modes of Governance in Europe: Governing in the Shadow of Hierarchy (Adrienne 
Heritier & Martin Rhodes eds., 2010); Fritz W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effec-
tive and Democratic? (1999). 
 26. See Braithwaite & Drahos, supra note 10; King, supra note 10, Managing Crises, 
supra note 10. 
 27. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 10; Braithwaite, supra note 10. 
 28. See, e.g., Declan Roche, Restorative Justice and the Regulatory State in South African 
Townships, 42 Brit. J. Criminology 514 (2002). 
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of the policy environment in China from that particular perspec-
tive.29 The aim of this paper is to selectively assess progress on that 
 
 29. See Environmental Governance in China (Neil T. Carter & Arthur P.J. Mol 
eds., 2007); China’s Environment and the Challenge of Sustainable Development 
(Kristen A. Day ed., 2005); Dic Lo, Market and Institutional Regulation in Chinese 
Industrialization, 1978–94 (1997); Ding Lu & Zhimin Tang, State Intervention and 
Business in China: The Role of Preferential Policies (1997); Elizabeth C. Economy, 
The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future (2d ed. 
2010); Managing the Chinese Environment (Richard L. Edmonds ed., 2000); Economic 
Analysis of Law in China (Thomas Eger et al. eds., 2007); Competition Policy and Reg-
ulation: Recent Developments in China, the US, and Europe (Michael Faure & Xinzhu 
Zhang eds., 2011); Challenges Facing Chinese Political Development (Sujian Guo ed., 
2007); Chen Gang, Politics of China’s Environmental Protection: Problems and 
Progress (2009); Harwit, China’s Telecommunications Revolution (2008); Roselyn 
Hsueh, China’s Regulatory State: A New Strategy for Globalization (2011); Gov-
ernance, Regulation, and Privatization in the Asia-Pacific Region (Takatoshi Ito & 
Anne O. Krueger eds., 2004); China’s Environmental Crisis: Domestic and Global Im-
pacts and Responses (Joel J. Kassiola & Sujian Guo eds., 2010); Economic Growth and 
Environmental Regulation: The People’s Republic of China’s Path to a Brighter 
Future (Tun Lin & Timothy Swanson eds., 2010); Xiaoying Ma & Leonard Ortolano, 
Environmental Regulation in China: Institutions, Enforcement, and Compliance 
(2000); Financial Regulation in the Greater China Area: Mainland China, Taiwan, 
and Hong Kong SAR (Joseph J.Norton et al. eds., 2000); Geoffrey Murray & Ian G. 
Cook, Green China: Seeking Ecological Alternatives (2002); Benjamin van Rooij, 
Regulating Land and Pollution in China: Lawmaking, Compliance, and Enforce-
ment: Theory and Cases (2006); Eric Lester Ross, Environmental Policy in China 
(1988); Barbara J. Sinkule & Leonard Ortolano, Implementing Environmental Policy 
in China (1995); Phillip Stalley, Foreign Firms, Investment, and Environmental 
Regulation in the People’s Republic of China (2010); Xu Yan & Douglas Pitt, Chi-
nese Telecommunications Policy (2002); Dali L. Yang, Remaking the Chinese Levia-
than: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China (2004); Xin 
Zhang, International Trade Regulation in China: Law and Policy (2006); David Bach 
et al., The International Implications of China’s Fledgling Regulatory State: From Product Maker to 
Rule Maker, 11 New Pol. Econ. 499–518 (2006); ; Sebastian Heilmann, Regulatory Innovation 
by Leninist Means: Communist Party Supervision in China’s Financial Industry, 181 China Q. 1–21 
(2005); Kenneth G. Lieberthal, China’s Governing System and Its Impact on Environmental Policy 
Implementation, China Env’t Series 3–8 (1997); Peng Liu, From Decentralized Developmental 
State toward Authoritarian Regulatory State: A Case Study on Drug Safety Regulation in China, 8 
China: Int’l J. 110–37 (2010); Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, The Economics of Environ-
mental Policy Implementation: Chinese Insights, 53 Econ. & Pol’y Energy & Env’t 105–27 
(2010); Roda Mushkat, Contextualizing Environmental Human Rights: A Relativist Perspective, 26 
Pace Envtl L. Rev. 119–77 (2009) [hereinafter Mushkat, Contextualizing Environmental Hu-
man Rights]; Roda Mushkat, Implementing Environmental Law in Transitional Settings: The Chi-
nese Experience, 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 45–94 (2008) [hereinafter Mushkat, Implementing 
Environmental Law]; Margaret M. Pearson, Governing the Chinese Economy: Regulatory Reform in 
the Service of the State, 67 Pub. Admin. Rev. 718–30 (2007) [hereinafter Pearson, Governing the 
Chinese Economy]; Margaret M. Pearson, The Business of Governing Business in China: Institutions 
and Norms of the Emerging Regulatory State, 57 World Pol. 296–322 (2005) [hereinafter Pear-
son, The Business of Governing Business in China]; Lester Ross, The Implementation of Environmen-
tal Policy in China, 15 Admin. & Soc’y 489–516 (1984); Hakon U. Steen, Limits to the Regulatory 
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front by evaluating some of the key insights generated in the process. 
A review of the studies highlighted for this purpose precedes the ap-
praisal. We subsequently show that the rich picture collectively 
painted in the work on the subject is not without ambiguities and 
gaps, that the mainstream and peripheral elements may need to be 
better aligned, and that a more critical approach to the practices ob-
served may be warranted. 
II. Chinese Model 
A. Historical Backdrop 
Following its 1949 military victory over the Nationalist forces 
and subsequent consolidation of power, the Communist Party (CCP) 
did not proceed forthwith to dismantle market structures, embrace 
bureaucratic resource allocation mechanisms, and eliminate private 
ownership of the means of production in China.30 Unlike in the po-
litical domain, the tightening of top-down economic controls and na-
tionalization of the means of production for the most part was initial-
ly undertaken in a gradual and non-abrupt fashion. The pace 
accelerated markedly and structural transformation assumed an in-
creasingly coercive character from the mid-1950s onwards.31 But no 
consistent strategy was pursued in the following years.32 Instead, 
 
State in the Rule-Making of Digital Convergence: A Case Study of Mobile TV Standards in the Euro-
pean Union and China, 23 Tech. Analysis & Strategic Mgmt. 759–72 (2011); Waikeung 
Tam & Dali L. Yang, Food Safety and the Development of Regulatory Institutions in China, 29 
Asian Persp. 5–36 (2005); Dali L. Yang, Regulatory Learning and Its Discontents in China: Prom-
ise and Tragedy at the State Food and Drug Administration, in Regulation in Asia: Pushing 
Back on Globalization 139–62 (John Gillepsie & Randall Peerenboom eds., 2009) [hereinaf-
ter Yang, Regulatory Learning and Its Discontents]; Yukyung Yeo, Between Owner and Regulator: 
Governing the Business of China’s Telecommunications Service Industry, 200 China Q. 1013–32 
(2009); Yukyung Yeo & Martin Painter, Diffusion, Transmutation, and Regulatory Regime in So-
cialist Market Economies: Comparing China and Vietnam, 24 Pac. Rev. 375–95 (2011); Yukyung 
Yeo & Margaret M. Pearson, Regulating Decentralized Industries: China’s Auto Industry, 8 China 
Rev. 231–59 (2008). 
 30. See Gregory C. Chow, China’s Economic Transformation (2d ed. 2007) [here-
inafter Chow, Economic Transformation]; Gregory C. Chow, Interpreting China’s 
Economy (2010) [hereinafter Chow, Interpreting China’s Economy]; Cai Fang et al., 
The Chinese Economy: Reform and Development (2009); Kenneth G. Lieberthal, 
Governing China: From Revolution to Reform (2d ed. 2004); Barry Naughton, The 
Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (2007); Tony Saich, Governance and 
Politics of China (3d ed. 2010); Jinglian Wu, Understanding and Interpreting Chi-
nese Economic Reform (2005). 
 31. See sources cited supra note 30.  
 32. See sources cited supra note 30. 
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waves of centralization and decentralization ensued.33 Nevertheless, 
the loosening of central authority was primarily an administrative and 
temporary phenomenon, and marketization and privatization were 
never contemplated other than on a modest scale and for predomi-
nantly tactical reasons (i.e., in order to restore efficiency and stability 
in the aftermath of disastrous policy experiments, such as the Great 
Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution).34 
Genuine economic reform had to await the death of Chairman 
Mao Zedong in 1976 and the adoption of the Open Door Policy by 
his successors (spearheaded by paramount leader Deng Xiaoping) two 
years following that event. Some spectacular adjustments to the mac-
ro and micro steering framework were promptly made, but this has 
again been a rather uneven process (albeit not by the fluid standards 
of the revolutionary era).35 Gradualism was a feature of the period up 
to 1993 and the scope of liberalization has significantly broadened 
thereafter. 36  Yet, the occasional pauses and sideways movement 
should not obscure the fact that the commitment to change and for-
ward momentum has remained basically intact for more than three 
decades.37 Despite a certain lack of strategic coherence at times, the 
reform era has not seen the kind of sharp policy swings witnessed 
previously.38 
The overhaul of the mode of governance has not been an exclu-
sively economic undertaking. A distinctly “dilettante” form of public 
administration can be said to have given way to one of the “bureau-
cratic” (i.e., professional or semi-professional) variety.39 A “totalistic” 
State has staged a partial retreat, and a more “participatory” type has 
emerged.40 But the transformation in the economic domain has been 
by far the most dramatic.41 Macro and micro intervention has grown 
less intensive and less prevalent, privatization has steadily increased in 
scale, and regulation has evolved into a more flexible and subtle ad-
 
 33. See sources cited supra note 30. 
 34. See sources cited supra note 30. 
 35. See sources cited supra note 30. 
 36. See sources cited supra note 30. 
 37. See sources cited supra note 30. 
 38. See sources cited supra note 30. 
 39. See Qinghua Wang, The “State of the State” in Reform Era China, 35 Asian Persp. 89, 
96–97 (2011). 
 40. Id. at 97–98. 
 41. Id. at 98–99. 
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ministrative tool.42 Notably, consistent with patterns observed in 
regulatory states, essentially indirect regulation has generally come to 
be preferred over elaborate top-down guidance and oversight.43 
B. Changing Governance Modes 
It is thus legitimate to argue that deregulation trends have fun-
damentally diverged from their privatization counterparts. In the lat-
ter case, the noted shifts—while not entirely smooth—have displayed 
greater persistence and less ambiguity.44 In the former case, they 
have been more multi-directional and not as easy to read in that the 
tentative rise of rule-based governance has meant that the rolling 
back of the State in this respect has coincided with an expansion of 
regulatory activity, although not necessarily organized along the lines 
of the traditional-style command-and-control model.45 The corollary 
is that the term “deregulation” perhaps does not fully reflect the 
post-1978 Chinese economic experience because an array of mostly 
new regulatory initiatives has come into being at the same time that 
others have been relegated to the periphery.46 
This is not to imply that deregulation, when and where it has 
been implemented, has typically been half-hearted, narrowly focused, 
shallow, and short-lived. Often the opposite pattern has been seen. 
The experience of the telecommunications sector is an illuminating 
example. Even the pre-1994 journey from the contractual responsi-
bility scheme to the economic accounting system, material incentives, 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.; see also China’s Deep Reform: Domestic Politics in Transition (Lowell 
Dittmer & Guoli Li eds., 2006); China Today, China Tomorrow: Domestic Politics, 
Economy and Society (Joseph Fewsmith ed., 2010) [hereinafter China Today, China To-
morrow]; Chow, China’s Economic Transformation, supra note 30; Chow, Interpret-
ing China’s Economy, supra note 30; Fang et al., supra note 30; Transforming the Chi-
nese Economy (Cai Fang ed., 2010); Interpreting China’s Development (Wang Gungwu 
& John Wong eds., 2007); How Far Across the River: Chinese Policy Reform at the 
Millennium (Nicholas C. Hope et al. eds., 2003); Lieberthal, supra note 30; Naughton, 
supra note 30; Saich, supra note 30; Wu, supra note 30. 
 44. See, e.g., China Today, China Tomorrow, supra note 43; China’s Deep Reform: 
Domestic Politics in Transition, supra note 43; Chow, China’s Economic Transfor-
mation, supra note 30; Chow, Interpreting China’s Economy, supra note 30; Fang et al., 
supra note 30; Hope et al., supra note 43; Interpreting China’s Development, supra note 
43; Naughton, supra note 30; Transforming the Chinese Economy, supra note 43; Wu, 
supra note 30. 
 45. See Hsueh, supra note 29; Pearson, The Business of Governing Business in China, supra 
note 29; Pearson, Governing the Chinese Economy, supra note 29. 
 46. See sources cited supra note 45. 
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and eventual flexible financial policy was accompanied by progressive 
widening and deepening of the liberalization agenda, and it exhibited 
a considerable degree of consistency and interconnectedness.47 Sub-
sequent strategies have entailed further revamping that has thorough-
ly transformed the structure of this particular sector.48 The resulting 
configuration has aptly been portrayed as “China’s telecommunica-
tions revolution.”49 But this commonly invoked and extensively re-
searched case of policy evolution apparently has another side to it, 
which is equally telling. The mode of governance has indeed under-
gone fundamental change. Private operators have emerged, competi-
tion has intensified, and government intervention (including support) 
has markedly diminished.50 This seems to have consequently become 
a truly decentralized segment of the economy where the regulator’s 
proverbial “hand” is, on the face of it, largely “invisible.”51 Neverthe-
less, the reins of public control may not have been substantially re-
laxed. Rather, they may have merely assumed less rigid forms.52 Reg-
ulation may have thus given way to deregulation, which broadly 
speaking may have been deprived of much of its essence by reregula-
tion.53 
C. Theoretical Viewpoint 
The telecommunications sector experience is not an isolated case. 
Similar trends have been witnessed across the policy spectrum.54 In 
order to imbue them with analytical meaning, a typology of state 
control has been constructed by an empirically-oriented social scien-
tist, featuring four distinct regulatory schemes that reflect changing 
institutional realities during the reform era: expansionary, strategic, 
delegated, and decentralized.55 The first is characterized by deliber-
ate (goal) orientation, enhances central control (from the perspective 
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of government-business relations), and emphasizes reregulation 
(whereby new and reformulated rules increase central discretion). 
The second diverges from the expansionary mode in only its empha-
sis on liberalization (whereby rules increase central discretion and 
achieve sector-specific goals). The third is characterized by mixed 
orientation, produces mixed outcomes, and like the expansionary var-
iant, emphasizes reregulation (but this is a pattern whereby rules del-
egate regulatory enforcement to lower level of government).56 The 
fourth is characterized by incidental orientation, undermines gov-
ernment control, and emphasizes liberalization and deregulation 
(whereby rules relinquish rule making and enforcement to local gov-
ernment).57 
A switch from one institutional configuration to another may be 
likened to a paradigm or regime shift. Comprehensive and far-
reaching deregulation, in the strict sense of the term, is realized when 
a decentralized system is thoroughly embraced. But the four catego-
ries entail different degrees of “regulatory tightness” or centraliza-
tion/decentralization. The act of crossing regime “boundaries” is thus 
a step that, from a relative standpoint, involves stiffening or relaxa-
tion of public controls over private sector activities in virtually all cir-
cumstances. Irrespective of whether the issue is conceptualized as a 
dichotomy (regulation/reregulation versus deregulation) or a contin-
uum (consisting of categories that vary in the extent to which goals, 
business-government relations, and rules combine to determine the 
direction, flexibility, and openness of the regime), the picture that 
emerges in the post-1978 Chinese context is one of ongoing structur-
al transformation, with periodic swings from deregulation–
liberalization to reregulation, along the lines generally observed in 
other regulatory states.58 
Specifically, the 1979–2010 period may effectively be divided into 
six distinct phases: (1) 1979–83 Liberalization (1978 Open Door Pol-
icy, which initiated agricultural reforms, household responsibility sys-
tem; 1979 Joint Venture Law; 1980 creation of special economic 
zones); (2) 1984–91 Reregulation (1984–87 urban reforms and exper-
imentations, fiscal reforms/revenue sharing/tax responsibility system, 
rise of quasi-State, quasi-private enterprises, and opening of fourteen 
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coastal cities and Hainan Island to foreign direct investment (FDI); 
1986 Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises, 1988 Law on Si-
no-Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures, separation of administrative 
from party functions; 1988 State sector restructuring); (3) 1992–97 
Liberalization (Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 Southern Tour, coastal devel-
opment strategy/influx of FDI; 1993 administrative and State sector 
restructuring; 1994 Foreign Trade Law; 1994 unification of official 
and market exchange rates; 1996 current account convertibility; 1994 
Company Law/corporatization and privatization of state owned en-
terprises (SOEs), separation of ownership from regulatory functions; 
tax and fiscal reforms/decentralization, Western Development Strat-
egy); (4) 1998–2001 Reregulation (administrative and State sector re-
structuring, including Grab Large Release Small, foreign market en-
try/business scope and investment level recalibrated; 1999 World 
Trade Organization (WTO) accession protocol agreements on FDI 
and market liberalization, separation of ownership from regulatory 
functions); (5) 2002–05 Liberalization (2003 administrative and State 
sector restructuring, 2004 Foreign Trade Law and other WTO im-
plementation rules, 2003 “Harmonious Society Strategy”); and (6) 
2006–10 Reregulation (reformulated laws, focusing on bankrupt-
cy/government, procurement/labor, contract/mergers, and acquisi-
tions; measures to enhance orderliness of foreign-driven mergers and 
acquisitions, 2008 administrative and State sector restructuring).59 
One obvious conclusion shown from these institutional dynamics 
is that, as widely seen elsewhere, China’s regulatory State is charac-
terized by a mixture of punctuated equilibriums60 and path depend-
ence.61 Strains within the system induce regime shifts (regulation-
deregulation, liberalization-reregulation) or disturb its equilibrium, 
but the system tends to oscillate within a well-defined range, without 
necessarily returning to the point of departure (it evolves rather than 
stagnates). Differentiation or evolution over time may take place be-
cause of the multidimensional nature of the typology. Had it been 
confined to just two categories or institutional configurations and re-
gimes, the scope for genuine change would have been quite limited, 
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merely allowing swings from one set of conditions to another and 
back to the point of origin (subject to the qualification that the cate-
gories are sufficiently broad to accommodate some variation). 
To arrive at conclusions regarding the individual phases requires 
a more detailed examination of the thrust of policies pursued on a 
multiyear basis. Such a perusal reveals a propensity—most apparent 
during the latest reregulation drive—to follow a bifurcated approach 
with respect to State control over the economy: essentially expan-
sionary for strategic sectors (cars, energy, financial services, and tele-
communications) and fundamentally decentralized for non-strategic 
ones (consumer electronics, food, paper, and textiles).62 The former 
element seems to eclipse the latter and the overall pattern is thus por-
trayed as possessing attributes akin to reregulation rather than liber-
alization.63 The approach is believed to have been adopted in order 
to cope optimally with pressures stemming from globalization—
particularly those associated with WTO membership—and manage 
them in a manner conducive to the preservation of the political re-
gime.64 
Within this policy framework, strategic sectors are subject to ini-
tiatives such as separation of enterprises from government bureaucra-
cy, corporatization, business restructuring or creation of SOE 
groups, public listing, introduction of competition between SOEs 
and sometimes the non-State sector, and strict rules on entry (no 
non-State entry, domestic sector only, or foreign investment through 
joint ventures).65 The non-strategic sectors, on the other hand, enjoy 
greater freedom of action by virtue of experiencing a divestment of 
State assets to former managers, corporatization, business restructur-
ing, public listing (the last three measures extend beyond what is wit-
nessed in the focal category), liberalization of market entry, private 
sector dynamism (encompassing quasi-State, quasi private firms, and 
FDI), and local approval of market entry and licensure of business 
scope.66 
This institutional configuration, characterized by policy oscilla-
tion and sectoral duality, has not been conjured up by a lone scholar 
grasping at intellectual straws—it has been widely acknowledged and 
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documented.67 The picture consistently painted is one showing a 
normative preference for fostering a more competitive economy 
while deploying State assets along lines supporting State goals.68 This 
manifests itself repeatedly in market restructuring designed to avoid 
“harmful competition.”69 China’s most valued State firms in strategic 
sectors (the economic lifeline, or jingji mingmai) are at the heart of 
the deregulation-liberalization–reregulation seesaw movement. They 
are corporatized, distanced from the ministries overseeing them 
(some of which have been downgraded or abolished), and undergo a 
degree of diversification in their ownership.70 Moreover, new, sup-
posedly less restrictive, mechanisms are ushered in to steer them.71 
But at the same time, parallel steps are taken to bolster central au-
thority and tighten supervision of such firms and sectors.72 
This type of a policy response to encroaching forces of globaliza-
tion, or any exogenous pressures, is by no means uncommon and 
cannot be depicted as uniquely Chinese in every respect. It is true 
that some states choose to adapt as fully and unambiguously as realis-
tically possible, which essentially amounts to “letting external/other 
regimes rule,” and a possible withering away of the State.73 “Com-
munitarianism, deliberation, direct democracy, and governance” (i.e., 
allowing or encouraging greater citizen participation in the policy 
process) have also been touted as a viable strategy to counter the ho-
mogenizing influences of globalization.74 But not all states succumb 
entirely to such influences. Those that do not give in try to resist or 
reassert control,75 and it may be argued that China and its regulatory 
policy fall into this category. 
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The (partial) resistance model looms large in the economics and 
political science literature. The former body of academic work cur-
rently accords a prominent place to strategic trade theory, a marked 
departure from mainstream formulations that emphasize gains accru-
ing to participants in unfettered international economic exchanges.76 
Its proponents assume that in certain sectors featuring a small num-
ber of players (i.e., oligopoly-like conditions), increasing returns to 
scale, and substantial network effects, government intervention in the 
form of an active industrial policy and a judicious use of external bar-
riers (i.e., tariffs and the like) may enhance national comparative ad-
vantage and thus boost the welfare of a country.77 It is not unreason-
able to suggest that the Chinese regulatory State, as portrayed by 
scholars who dissect its modus operandi, may somehow draw its inspi-
ration from this school of thought. 
Political scientists address the issue from a broadly similar angle 
by invoking the concept of an East Asian developmental State.78 This 
institutional pattern combines strong government direction, a meas-
ure of civil society and private sector initiative, and a fairly high de-
gree of organizational certainty and transparency.79 The key partici-
pants in the policy process share common goals (with economic 
growth being favored over redistribution), and enjoy close coopera-
tion.80 The State machinery is insulated from exogenous pressures 
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along Weberian lines (and thus displays neutrality), but at the same 
time it is deeply immersed in the surrounding social milieu.81 The 
barriers shielding it from partisan pressures, reinforced by firm em-
beddedness in the community, provide it with the transformative ca-
pacity to foster change through governed interdependence between 
public authorities and private agents.82 It can be said that China’s 
regulatory State selectively exhibits such strategically focused inter-
ventionism and neo-mercantilism. 
An empirically-oriented social scientist has put forward a coun-
ter-argument asserting that the parallels should not be overstated be-
cause the divergences are as notable as the convergences.83 Im-
portantly, the post-1978 Chinese variant has been far more positively 
disposed toward FDI than its East Asian counterparts and has, in fact, 
pursued a growth strategy according it a leading role.84 The “strong 
state, weak society” configuration, whereby a powerful central au-
thority drives an (initially) amorphous social body, has also been less 
discernible in China due to the empowerment of local interests, typi-
cally at the expense of the national government apparatus.85 In addi-
tion, the Chinese regulatory State has acted more arbitrarily in allo-
cating credit (often discriminating against the private sector in favor 
of SOEs), has been less inclined to respect property rights, and has 
generally not adhered as strictly to market-conforming principles.86 
But this is not a clear-cut picture and some socio-legal scholars—
while acknowledging that China may not fully correspond to the East 
Asian model (which is by no means homogeneous) and may even be 
portrayed as a “paradoxical developmental State”—nevertheless con-
tend that it is not a distant outlier and displays sufficient similarities 
to be placed in this broad category.87 Such differences of opinion 
highlight the complexity and dynamic nature of the Chinese regula-
tory State, an institutional entity that is unique in some respects, but 
one that reflects politico-economic influences that have region-wide 
underpinnings. It is a phenomenon that has evoked much intellectual 
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curiosity and has attracted considerable academic attention. The re-
search on the subject is substantial and still ongoing. Yet certain as-
pects may have been left unattended, and some questions remain un-
answered. The literature has evolved to a point whereby it may be 
appropriate to bring this into focus. 
III. Ambiguities and Gaps 
A. Common Analytical Assumptions 
For the most part, studies exploring China’s regulatory State de-
pict it as a cohesive player that systematically pursues a coherent 
strategy designed to fulfill clearly articulated goals. There is no im-
plication that the purpose is necessarily to serve the public interest in 
the technical sense of the term.88 The CCP or the ruling elite may be 
partly motivated by a desire to preserve the political regime in its 
present form in the face of strong international (particularly those 
stemming from globalization) and domestic headwinds. But it is not 
unreasonable to conclude that the structure of the argument inevita-
bly leads, albeit not unambiguously, in this direction. It is legitimate 
to infer that the policy mix chosen is, to some extent, a product of the 
perception that this is the “best” course of action for the country to 
follow in the prevailing politico-economic circumstances. 
This conception has its origins in a number of sources, theories 
of public interest89 being merely one of them. There are traces of 
classical microeconomic thinking, which treats commercial organiza-
tions and firms as profit-maximizing holistic entities.90 Similar link-
ages may be established to realist/neo-realist theories of international 
relations and liberal institutionalism. Both of these theories view the 
State as a unitary actor, either driven by narrow self-interest (which 
may or may not be equated with the public interest) in a competitive 
fashion, or propelled by a somewhat broader set of factors, including 
an appreciation of the merits of international cooperation.91 Above 
all perhaps, a close relationship may be identified with the compre-
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hensive-rational decision-making model embraced by social scientists 
of various disciplinary backgrounds sympathetic to the notion that 
individuals and collective entities (groups, organizations, states, and 
the like) typically proceed cohesively and effectively to attain well-
defined goals.92 
B. Missing Elements 
Without abandoning or modifying this (partly) credible and time-
honored analytical framework, it is entirely possible to take a path 
that may diverge in some respects from that normally chosen by stu-
dents of the Chinese regulatory State. The point is that post-1978 
China has generally preferred, even after 1993, to restructure its eco-
nomic and political system gradually rather than through sweeping 
reforms, and has tended to address comparatively “easy” problems 
before tackling relatively “difficult” ones.93 This penchant for strate-
gic incrementalism has apparently been rooted in finely-honed logic 
predicated on the assumption that orderly stepwise adjustment 
(“crossing the river by groping stones”) is a productive form of policy 
experimentation that (ex ante) minimizes disruption induced by un-
certainty, (ex post) facilitates error correction, and (both ex ante and ex 
post) maximizes political acceptability.94 
When examined from this perspective, the intricate and protract-
ed regulation-deregulation-reregulation process may be merely in its 
intermediate stages. The regulatory State may have crystallized into a 
selectively decentralized, but predominantly centralized, institutional 
structure not because it reflects the ultimate strategic blueprint, if 
any, but due to the fact that prevailing conditions militate against fur-
ther evolution. Or, to express it differently, the regulatory State may 
be a tactically-inspired transitional arrangement rather than a deeply 
entrenched system destined to serve as a long-term mechanism for 
promoting integration on Chinese terms into the global economy. 
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Indeed, there is a small body of academic work suggesting that China 
may be diverging from the East Asian developmental State, which it-
self is in throes of transition.95 The proposition is that this regional 
power may be differentiating itself in a fundamental respect by slowly 
progressing toward the much looser Anglo-Saxon regulatory mod-
el—a significantly smaller micro-level/sector-specific form of gov-
ernment intervention.96 It follows that this domain of socio-legal in-
quiry may be one where researchers face more imponderables than 
commonly believed. 
C. Incomplete Picture Painted 
In addition to such lingering ambiguities, the Chinese regulatory 
State, as presented in the mainstream literature, may be a one-
dimensional construct, or at least an analytical vehicle that is overly 
narrow in scope. Scholarly attention focuses almost exclusively on 
government-business relations (i.e., economic regulation). Patterns of 
authority inside the public bureaucracy are either largely overlooked 
or inadequately explored. Insights and empirical findings regarding 
environmental and social regulation, which cannot be discarded as 
modest and scarcely illuminating, are not consistently and systemati-
cally incorporated into the research agenda. Most of the enlighten-
ing, but highly concentrated discussion, revolves around policy con-
tent (i.e., strategies, laws, regulations, and the like), with limited 
resources being channeled toward the examination of other key facets 
and phases of the policy architecture and cycle (e.g., context, agenda 
setting, formulation, decision making, implementation, evaluation, 
and the like). A thoroughly critical appraisal of institutional realities 
is seldom offered. 
Rule-based direction and control inside the boundaries of the 
(modern) regulatory State (i.e., internally standard-driven as distinct 
from external guidance and oversight) is one of its salient characteris-
tics.97 This is not a widely recognized and studied phenomenon: “We 
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are not accustomed to think of government as ‘regulating’ itself.”98 
By the same token, “[t]he word regulation is not generally used to 
denote the various ways in which public organizations are shaped by 
rules and standards emanating from arm’s-length authorities.” 99 
Nevertheless, “there is a range of regulation processes inside gov-
ernment,”100 which are now an integral component of the socio-legal 
research agenda. Moreover, their effective development is deemed to 
be essential for a smooth functioning of the regulatory State.101 
China’s leaders are not oblivious to this fact. Since 1993, they 
have undertaken a number of rounds of “administrative and State 
sector restructuring,” some more comprehensive than others. 102 
Scholars who dissect the workings of the Chinese regulatory State 
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outline them in considerable detail.103 But the issue of adequacy and 
impact is not fully addressed. Most students of public administration 
do not consider these institutional re-engineering efforts to be far-
reaching enough or sufficiently successful.104 A minority of research-
ers in the field—employing an elaborate principal-agent frame-
work—produce a somewhat less negative verdict, but without neces-
sarily painting an entirely reassuring picture.105 Whatever the quality 
of the external rule-based governance blueprint and machinery, it 
may thus be argued that the internal element does not rest on a truly 
solid foundation. 
D. Regime Performance Overstated 
This lies at the heart of the question of China’s State capacity. 
Empirical work on the subject has yielded inconclusive insights.106 
But the weight of the evidence suggests that, despite the impressive 
post-1978 economic record, the government’s ability to perform reg-
ulatory functions leaves something to be desired; this observation is 
 
 103. See Hsueh, supra note 29, at 26–28. 
 104. See Chou, Governing Capacity, supra note 102; Chou, Civil Service Reform in Chi-
na, supra note 102; Chou, Does “Good Governance” Matter?, supra note 102; Chou, Reform of Per-
formance Appraisal, supra note 102; Drewry & Chan, supra note 102; Pei, supra note 102. 
 105. See Xiaoqi, supra note 102; Burns & Xiaoqi, supra note 102; see also Ping, supra note 
102; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, supra note 102. 
 106. See, e.g., Chou, Governing Capacity, supra note 102; Forging Environmental-
ism: Justice, Livelihood, and Contested Environments (Joanne Bauer ed., 2006); Hold-
ing China Together: Diversity and National Integration in the Post-Deng Era 
(Barry J. Naughton & Dali L. Yang eds., 2004); Pei, supra note 102; Wang Shaoguang & Hu 
Angang, The Chinese Economy in Crisis: State Capacity and Tax Reform (2001); 
Vivienne Shue, The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic 
(1988); State Capacity in East Asia: Japan, Taiwan, China, Taiwan, and Vietnam 
(Kield E. Brodsgaard & Susan Young eds., 2000); State Power and Social Forces: Domi-
nation and Transformation in the Third World (Joel S. Migdal et al. eds., 1994); Paul 
Collins & Hon S. Chan, State Capacity Building in China: An Introduction, 29 Pub. Admin. & 
Dev. 1 (2009); Yanzhong Huang & Dali L. Yang, Population Control and State Coercion in China, 
in Holding China Together: Diversity and National Integration in the Post-Deng 
Era, supra, at 6; W. Li & Hon S. Chan, Clear Air in Urban China: The Case of Inter-Agency Coor-
dination in Chongqing’s Blue Sky Program, 29 Pub. Admin. & Dev. 55 (2009); Mushkat, Contex-
tualizing Environmental Human Rights, supra note 29; Mushkat, Implementing Environmental 
Law, supra note 29; Mushkat & Mushkat, supra note 29; Wang Shaoguang, The Problem of State 
Weakness, 14 J. Democracy 36 (2003); Wang Shaoguang, Regulating Death at Coalmines: Chang-
ing Mode of Governance in China, 15 J. Contemp. China 1 (2006); Jonathan Schwartz & Grego-
ry Evans, Causes of Effective Policy Implementation: China’s Public Response to SARS, 16 J. Con-
temp. China 195 (2007); Jonathan Schwartz, The Impact of State Capacity on Enforcement of 
Environmental Policies: The Case of China, 12 J. Env’t & Dev. 50 (2003). 
 BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 27 
168 
valid even though, as a crisis erupts, it typically manages to mobilize 
sufficient resources decisively enough to eventually contain it.107 
Whether or not this combination of endeavoring to overhaul flawed 
institutional structures, ultimately falling short, proceeding in a step-
wise fashion, and responding forcefully to serious perturbations may 
ensure satisfactory evolution of the regulatory State, in a manner 
largely or fully commensurate with exogenous and endogenous chal-
lenges, merits closer attention than it has received thus far. This is 
true both in general and in this particular context, notably at the two 
levels in relation to policy implementation (including enforcement). 
Relevant lessons may also be drawn in light of experience in the 
environmental and social management domains. In the former realm, 
certain problematic features stand out. One is the persistently (albeit 
decreasingly so), ambiguous, goading, non-transparent, and provi-
sional nature of key visible components (laws, regulations, and the 
like) of the governance edifice. This was poignantly highlighted in 
the 1990s when a legal scholar noted that the Environmental Protec-
tion Law was designed “only to outline China’s basic policies on en-
vironmental matters.”108 He proceeded to observe it obscurely stipu-
lated that “[t]he waters of rivers, lakes, seas, and reservoirs must be 
protected and a good quality of water maintained,”109 and that it 
loosely required that “[e]ffective measures . . . be taken to eliminate 
smoke and dust from all smoke-emitting equipment, industrial kilns 
and furnaces, motor-driven vehicles, and boats and ships.”110 This 
prompted him to assert that “statutes still perform a rhetorical role in 
China, offering direction to those whose activities implicate the envi-
ronmental issues described in the statute, but not necessarily antici-
pating litigation over the application of the statute in particular cas-
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es.”111 A decade later, another legal researcher furnished an essential-
ly similar assessment: 
Numerous environmental laws suffer from vagueness and put for-
ward general, almost exhortational terms. Even the amended Air 
Pollution Prevention and Control Law provides, in article 19, that 
“enterprises shall give priority to the adoption of clean production 
techniques” and, according to Article 30, enterprises “shall gradual-
ly adopt measures to control nitrogen oxide,” while the local gov-
ernments “shall redouble their efforts in afforestation, grass-
planting, urban and rural greening, and take effective measures to 
do well the work [of prevention and control].”112 
Such opaque policy content undermines implementation in gen-
eral and enforcement in particular. The difficulties are compounded 
by the often indeterminate status of key legislative acts;113 their lack 
of visibility (statutes are not always published, particularly those en-
acted at the regional and local level);114 unavailability of a significant 
body of authoritative judicial precedents;115 absence of an authorita-
tive and coherent statutory interpretation structure;116 inadequate 
conversion of statutory provisions into workable regulatory mecha-
nisms and standards;117 a weak deterrence system;118 and a judiciary 
that is organizationally, politically, and technically feeble, deprived of 
resources, and marginalized because of a widespread preference for 
alternative modes (both formal and informal) of dispute resolution.119 
Another notable characteristic of the environmental segment of 
the Chinese regulatory State is the inherent tension between the stra-
tegic goals that shape its operations and its vertical fragmentation. 
Regarding the first factor, the simultaneous pursuit of the twin objec-
tives of economic betterment and ecological preservation is a source 
of enduring conflicts that require difficult trade-offs.120 The former 
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goal has traditionally dominated, but this is becoming an increasingly 
challenging balancing act.121 The point to emphasize is that institu-
tional development is subject to multiple influences and that regula-
tion in its various forms may be a less coherent strategic undertaking 
than implied in the literature on the subject (and in sources associated 
with theoretical antecedents, such as classical microeconomics, real-
ist/neo-realist school of international relations, liberal institutional-
ism, and the rational-comprehensive decision model). 
Vertical fragmentation is a pervasive phenomenon commonly at-
tributable to excessively long organizational chains.122 In a large and 
diverse country like China, it is bound to manifest itself more acutely 
than in other institutional milieus. Yet in this case, it is deemed to be 
the product of additional factors—some the result of deliberate de-
sign and some reflecting the impact of semi-autonomous forces.123 
Whatever the underlying causes, and irrespective of how they coa-
lesce to produce specific policy outcomes, vertical fragmentation in 
the environmental sphere is typically seen when strategic signals em-
anating from the national regulatory center do not affect, or do so 
modestly, the behavior of agents at the local and regional periphery. 
Broadly speaking, this stems from the unwillingness or inability (tan-
tamount to inadequate State capacity) of the center to implement or 
enforce its ecological agenda through vital local channels. A legal 
scholar has described the problem in the following terms: 
Generally, the success or failure of laws depends on how effectively 
they are enforced, especially at the local level. But local govern-
ments are often major shareholders of polluting enterprises creating 
an inherent conflict of interest. Nevertheless, the laws presume that 
environmental protection bureaus representing a part of local gov-
ernments will successfully coordinate with the national body, SEPA 
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[State Environmental Protection Agency upgraded in 2008 to a 
Ministry of Environmental Protection/MEP]. In theory, the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China operates a unitary national [S]tate where 
legislation and directives emanate from central Beijing to which 
sub-national units of governments must adhere. In practice, howev-
er, this high degree of administrative cohesion does not exist. The 
laws fail to anticipate the possibility that certain government inter-
ests might diverge sharply from those of the environment depart-
ment and create a major obstacle to strict enforcement of both na-
tional and local environmental legislation.124 
And as she has further elaborated: 
In reality, the sub-national administrative departments rather tend 
to look to the people’s governments at their own level than to cen-
tral authorities since their funding and enforcement powers rely on 
local district authorities. The fact that local governments very often 
sponsor or own industries themselves and consider environmental 
regulations to be incompatible with economic growth makes it dif-
ficult for environmental protection bureaus to enforce their policy. 
Although the State Environmental Protection Agency[/Ministry of 
Environmental Protection] has formal authority over lower-level 
agencies, this national agency does not have much leverage in en-
suring that national regulations and standards are enforced at the 
local level. It is common practice that environmental issues are 
treated more as a matter of policy rather than law and personal rela-
tions are often decisive. Fees and fines are rarely determined au-
thoritatively; instead, they are often negotiated and fall far below 
the cost of damage that the harmful activity has caused, as well as 
below expenses for pollution control facilities.125 
Institutional fragmentation has a horizontal as well as a vertical 
dimension. The former manifests itself in the insufficiently elevated 
status of MEP and its SEPA predecessor (particularly the latter), 
their rather loose integration into the overall strategic management 
structure, and weak intra- and inter-organizational coordination 
mechanisms at lower levels of the administrative apparatus.126 This is 
not a predicament faced exclusively by decision makers in the envi-
ronmental domain, but a widespread phenomenon witnessed across 
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the entire policy spectrum.127 The high degree of vertical and hori-
zontal segmentation observed inside the politico-bureaucratic ma-
chinery has prompted social scientists to conclude that, superficial 
appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, the system could aptly 
be portrayed as one of “fragmented authoritarianism.”128 Both gov-
ernment fragmentation and authoritarian control have moderated 
somewhat as the post-1978 reforms have broadened and deepened, 
and it is now more common to employ the more palatable (as well as 
encompassing) expression “negotiated State” in depicting the Chi-
nese institutional milieu.129 
In this complex and diverse setting, power is diffuse and provid-
ing strategic direction in an effective fashion poses a considerable 
challenge.130 Moreover, conditions encourage regulatory carteliza-
tion (whereby policies are designed to placate special interests)131 and 
regulatory capture (whereby regulated parties heavily influence regu-
lators),132 both of which are amply seen in the environmental realm 
in China.133 The lesson to be drawn on the basis of experience in this 
policy sphere is that assuming an invariably high degree of strategic 
cohesion, coherence, and control in seeking to distil the essence of 
the Chinese regulatory State may not be an entirely viable line of in-
quiry. There is an acknowledgement in the literature on the subject 
that this is an element in the intricate analytical equation,134 but the 
issue is generally accorded modest attention and the picture that 
emerges does not duly reflect the fluidity of a constantly renegotiated 
political order buffeted by strong centrifugal forces. 
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Research on social regulation furnishes complementary insights. 
Importantly, it offers substantial support to the argument that the 
governance regime is characterized by pervasive fragmentation. It has 
thus been noted that the “most salient feature of China’s food safety 
regulatory system is the fragmentation of regulatory authority among 
different government agencies.”135 Specifically, at the time of writ-
ing, “the Ministry of Health (MoH), the Ministry of Agriculture 
(MoA), the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspec-
tion and Quarantine (GAQSIQ), the State Administration for Indus-
try and Commerce (SAIC), the Ministry of Commerce (MoC), and 
the State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) are actively in-
volved in regulating food safety.”136 This loose institutional pattern 
has few parallels and “is in sharp contrast with the regulatory regime 
in the United States.”137 It may be attributed to the often acclaimed 
piecemeal organizational reform process not undertaken within a 
comprehensive strategic framework and selectively responsible for 
the myriad implementation failures encountered in the social policy 
field. 
The fragmentation of the food safety regulatory regime in China 
is partly a legacy of stop-and-go changes in both legislation and insti-
tutional reforms. China’s Food Hygiene Law (Shipin weishengfa), 
promulgated in 1995, puts the MoH in charge of supervision and 
management of food hygiene. The MoH’s principal regulatory au-
thorities include issuing hygiene licenses to businesses engaged in 
food production, marketing or sales; monitoring, inspecting, and 
providing technical guidance for food hygiene; appraising and publi-
cizing the status of food hygiene; investigating and dealing with food 
poisoning or food contamination incidents; and imposing financial 
penalties or revoking the hygiene license of violators of the Food 
Hygiene Law. The MoA is responsible for formulating and enforcing 
quality and safety standards for agricultural inputs and farm products. 
For instance, the MoA sets the limits for pesticide residues in agricul-
tural products and monitors compliance with such standards. 
The GAQSIQ and the SAIC are also influential players in food 
safety regulation. The Product Quality Law (Chanpin zhiliangfa), en-
acted in 2000, authorizes the GAQSIQ to take the lead in regulating 
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product quality, including the quality of foodstuffs. The GAQSIQ 
issues production permits for food processors and producers, super-
vises licensed food enterprises for compliance with regulations con-
cerning food manufacturing, packaging and labeling; and is empow-
ered to crack down on unlicensed food processing and production. It 
can issue fines, confiscate products, and ban food manufacturers from 
continuing production if they have violated the relevant rules. The 
SAIC oversees food safety in the “circulation” area. It issues business 
licenses and oversees food hygiene in urban and rural markets. Like 
the GAQSIQ, the SAIC is empowered to fine and revoke the busi-
ness license of violators. The MoC can enact and amend standards 
and rules regarding the procedures for food processing, packaging, 
storage, transportation, and sales. 
It should be noted that other bureaucratic agencies play some 
role in food safety regulation as well. For example, the China Petro-
leum and Chemical Industry Association (formerly the Ministry of 
Chemical Industry) and the Ministry of Public Security, two vital 
components of the regulatory façade, have effective authority to over-
see production, storage, and sales of methanol and industrial alco-
hol.138 
Institutional fragmentation in this crucial domain is believed to 
be a source of a host of serious problems, notably inadequate infor-
mation sharing,139 incongruities among the regulations and standards 
adopted by the different agencies involved,140 and widespread shirk-
ing and buck-passing.141 Regulatory cartelization and capture are also 
rife and manifest themselves in tolerance of counterfeiting (which 
may bring considerable economic benefits to localities) by local gov-
ernment officials,142 lax enforcement of food safety regulations,143 
and regulatory forbearance (ascribed to the revenue imperative and 
corruption) by agencies charged with regulation.144 The heavy em-
phasis on revenue-sharing is the product of flawed policy design (car-
telization and capture may, however, compound the problem) rather 
than fragmentation per se. It results in discriminatory and harmful 
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practices (e.g., imposition of financial penalties on lawbreakers, but 
reluctance to crack down on counterfeit foodstuffs),145 and excessive 
issuing of business licenses for purposes of collecting fees and charg-
es.146 The intense competition among regulatory agencies for a slice 
of the revenue pie compounds such difficulties.147 
As in the environmental realm, this configuration, to some extent, 
reflects the inherent tension between conflicting (in the short term) 
goals: robust economic expansion and satisfactory human safety.148 It 
has marginally diminished in urban areas, where regulatory oversight 
has slowly improved and consumers have grown more affluent and 
less docile.149 The picture in rural areas remains challenging because 
of spotty controls,150 low purchasing power of villagers that sustains 
demand for cheap but sub-standard goods, 151  villagers’ typically 
modest education level, and weak rights consciousness.152 Such di-
vergences should not be discarded lightly, since they aggravate the 
urban-rural divide and, in the long run, undermine social stability.153 
The corollary again is that, contrary to views at times expressed by 
students of economic regulation,154 a degree of caution needs to be 
exercised in assessing the organizational underpinnings, capacity, and 
effectiveness of the Chinese regulatory State. 
Nor should the adverse consequences of such institutional prac-
tices be allowed to go unheeded. A number of (belatedly) well-
publicized incidents, involving severe impact on human welfare, have 
now been subjected to careful scrutiny by social scientists.155 They 
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highlight the origins and scope of the 2004 fake infant milk scandal in 
Anhui’s Fuyang Municipality, which resulted in the death of at least 
twelve babies and hundreds of cases of serious infant malnutrition 
(e.g., big head and small body syndrome) from consuming substand-
ard milk powder.156 This tragic loss of life and severe human suffer-
ing subsequently turned out to be the local tip of a national iceberg, 
highlighting a string of blatant irregularities in the drug registration 
and approval process overseen by the State Food and Drug Admin-
istration (SFDA).157 
The SFDA experience is worth exploring further since it initially 
showed some promise when an aggressive and apparently forward-
looking (yet prone to mobilize support through informal channels) 
official, Zheng Xiaoyu, was appointed as head of the State Pharma-
ceutical Administration (SPA), which was subordinated at that junc-
ture to the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC).158 The 
SPA was not a modern-style drug regulator, but a body that primarily 
acted as the government’s steward of the pharmaceutical industry and 
was thus legitimately regarded as the “mother-in-law of China’s lead-
ing pharmaceutical enterprises.”159 Over time, it acquired some regu-
latory functions, including “supervision of the production and opera-
tion of pharmaceutical products, the right to approve licenses for the 
production and sale of medical devices, and the setting and imple-
mentation of national standards for medical devices, materials, ma-
chinery, and packaging.”160 
The SPA’s regulatory activities came quickly to overlap with 
those of the MoH, and this proved to be a source of constant fric-
tion.161 Zheng was, naturally, not content with that state of affairs, 
particularly the higher bureaucratic status enjoyed by the MoH rela-
tive to his own agency and the chaotic conditions prevailing in the 
burgeoning pharmaceutical industry.162 He advocated reforms in-
spired by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration model that ap-
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pealed to the country’s top decision makers, who opted in 1998 to 
merge regulatory functions over drugs and medical devices under one 
roof in the newly constituted State Drug Administration (SDA).163 
That body was presided over by Zheng, who was catapulted to vice-
ministerial rank, comfortably above that of the head of the MoH’s 
Drug Administration Bureau (DAB).164 Before long, the SDA as-
sumed responsibility for food safety regulation and was transformed 
into the SFDA in 2003.165 
Upon being elevated as the SDA’s first commissioner, Zheng 
embarked on a series of ambitious and progressive reforms that in-
cluded nationalizing standards for drugs, streamlining drug registra-
tion procedures, and vigorously promoting and expediting adoption 
of good practices for manufacturing (GMP), research (GLP), and 
sales (GSP).166 As a leading critic poignantly pointed out, “[h]ad this 
agenda been realized, it would have had an enormously positive im-
pact on the development of China’s pharmaceutical industry.”167 Un-
fortunately, “[a]s it transpired, . . . every one of the major reform ini-
tiatives launched on Zheng’s watch went awry.”168 From a regulatory 
perspective, the explanation for this regrettable turn of events is con-
sistent with the problematic socio-environmental trends outlined and 
accounted for previously. 
In the face of severe resource constraints, logistic hurdles, and 
enormous pressures exerted by pharmaceutical companies—rent-
seeking, paving the way for regulatory capture—the national drug 
approval, re-certification, and re-registration process was rapidly de-
railed and engulfed by a wave of corruption.169 Centralization of au-
thority and nationalization of standards—desirable undertakings in 
principle—concentrated enormous power in the hands of a few stra-
tegically positioned, unscrupulous, and unsupervised SDA and SFDA 
officials, allowing them to convert these two regulatory vehicles into 
rent-seeking machines. “In the absence of well-designed processes, 
the regulators had much discretion.”170 On the other side, “[f]or drug 
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companies, their livelihood entirely depended on whether or not 
[regulators] gave approval to their new drug applications and how fast 
the approvals were given.”171 Consequently, “[t]o get the approvals 
speedily, the companies would seek to bribe [the regulators]”172 who 
were only too happy to oblige.173 
In the end, the distortions and transgressions were brought to the 
attention of relevant parties, who proceeded to take short-term cor-
rective actions and implement medium-term remedial measures.174 
Whether or not entirely effective, the outcome illustrates that the 
Chinese regulatory State has a capacity for learning and renewal.175 
But the principal conclusion to be drawn in light of this costly and 
disruptive episode is once more that the governance regime is struc-
turally too fragile to be considered as a strategically focused, tightly 
managed, and vigorously-shielded-from-undue-influences entity. If 
not wholly, then at least in part, its functioning may perhaps be best 
captured by the “garbage can,” rather than comprehensive-rational 
model of decision making, which portrays formal institutions as “or-
ganized anarchies.”176 
Another dimension of the picture that merits close attention is 
the personal nature of the seemingly professional relationships 
among key players within this amorphous and readily manipulated 
system. The point to note is that Zheng and his close associates relied 
heavily on informal social networks, consisting predominantly of 
family members and trusted acquaintances, often employed in the 
pharmaceutical industry, to sustain their corrupt activities.177 The 
most vivid example involved Zheng’s wife, Liu Naixue, who followed 
him from Zhejiang to Beijing and became a highly compensated 
manager at the Beijing Jinsaishi biotech company.178 The bribes 
Zheng took were typically for approval of new drug applications, of-
ten collected by her and their son, Zheng Hairong.179 
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Regulatory theory does not comprehensively address this phe-
nomenon. Even the concepts of regulatory cartelization and capture, 
as well as rent-seeking, do not fully reflect its essence. The attempt to 
come to grips with goal displacement in regulatory agencies by de-
picting them as enterprises dominated by insiders whose objectives 
eventually come to dominate the policy agenda arguably does not go 
far enough in this respect.180 The incorporation of a network per-
spective into the analytical framework may potentially enrich it and 
make it more widely applicable. It has its origins in microeconomics, 
or the economics of the firm (now refashioned as organizational eco-
nomics),181 where the traditional distinction between markets and hi-
erarchies (as the two dominant social coordination mechanisms)182 
has given way to broader conceptual schemes that encompass net-
work (hence network institutionalism)183 and even bazaar-like forms 
of governance.184 In an enlightened milieu, networks entail produc-
tively organized cooperation, including reciprocity and gift ex-
change.185 
It has been amply demonstrated that networking has long been at 
the heart of China’s social life in all its forms and that it has remarka-
bly withstood the effects of massive shocks, both exogenous and en-
dogenous, and deep political transformations.186 The proposition has 
also been put forward that the social network, based on personal con-
nections and particularistic favors, remains the undisputed fulcrum of 
the Chinese governance regime.187 This may have negative as well as 
positive ramifications, especially if the analogy is stretched toward the 
bazaar end of the continuum. Wherever the emphasis is ultimately 
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placed, the Chinese regulatory State may not be properly fathomed 
unless viewed as an elaborate and tangled policy network. 
As matters stand, the focus in the economically-oriented academ-
ic writings on the subject is primarily on description and explanation, 
with evaluation playing a peripheral role. Scholars in the general field 
of law and economics posit and show that, in engineering a transition 
to a market economy, policy architects may choose to rely on private 
orderings, private litigation through courts, or regulation.188 Despite 
the dangers of cartelization, capture, rent-seeking, corruption, goal 
displacement, and other adverse consequences, the last and most gov-
ernment-dependent of these institutional mechanisms is not neces-
sarily an “inefficient” option.189 The regulatory space, however, is 
replete with different policy designs whose effectiveness hinges, inter 
alia, on a variety of factors such as State capacity, particularly with re-
spect to implementation, which clearly poses a serious challenge in 
China. 
Scant empirical findings are available to shed light on this signifi-
cant issue. A detailed case study has been produced documenting the 
“failures” of Chinese-style economic regulation in the strategic tele-
communications sector.190 This is a policy domain where, initially at 
least, contradictory initiatives were pursued, with the negative obsta-
cles largely offsetting the positive steps.191 Specifically, the sector was 
opened up to competition in a half-hearted and tentative fashion such 
that, in an unprecedented manner, the new market entrant, rather 
than the incumbent, was handicapped by a plethora of regulatory 
constraints, prompting analysts to portray the experiment as an exer-
cise in “asymmetric regulation.” 192  This illustrates the perils of 
flawed design and haphazard implementation. 
On the other hand, in a yet unpublished paper, three economists 
show empirically that China’s regulatory State can make a difference 
for the better.193 They first measure the power of government (prox-
ied by its ability to resolve business disputes) in a sample of markets 
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and then proceed to determine its impact on enterprise perfor-
mance.194 After controlling for the influence of a number of interven-
ing variables (entrepreneurial characteristics, enterprise features, re-
gional characteristics, industry dummies, and rent-seeking), they 
conclude that there is a positive correlation/relationship between the 
hypothesized “cause” and “effect.”195 It would be premature to draw 
any general inferences about the Chinese regulatory State on that ba-
sis, but the research suggests that it may selectively play a construc-
tive role in certain circumstances. 
A broadly similar institutional configuration in Japan has been 
subjected to extensive scrutiny. It is commonly believed that selective 
industrial policy interventions in that country have had at best a 
modest, if any, positive impact on economic growth, productivity, 
and welfare.196 Massive resources appear to have predominantly been 
channeled to large, politically strong, “backward sectors,” possibly 
implying that “public interest” has not been the principal motivating 
factor, or that parochial politics (cartelization, capture, and rent-
seeking) may have driven the strategy.197 The Japanese government 
has consequently been urged to abandon its traditional industrial (in-
cluding science and technology) policy and embrace financial and la-
bor market reforms with a view to spurring innovative activities.198 It 
remains to be seen whether a similar diagnosis and prognosis awaits 
China’s much vaunted regulatory State.199 
IV. Conclusion 
The post-1978 Chinese leadership has been restructuring the 
country’s governance regime for over three decades now. This has 
been an ambitious undertaking, generally pursued with a sense of 
purpose, determination, considerable skill, and flexibility. Under-
standably, given the economic uncertainties and political impedi-
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ments, the revamping of the ossified institutional edifice inherited 
from the revolutionary era was initially selective, but the scope of re-
forms has gradually broadened and has been carried out in an in-
creasingly bold fashion. Regardless, it remains a delicate balancing 
act, performed in an uneven manner. Consistently robust economic 
expansion, enjoyed in a stable socio-political climate, may legitimate-
ly be viewed as a mark of great success. The apparent success of the 
uninterrupted three-decade long forward thrust, however, has not 
been achieved without heavy costs and alternative explanations are 
available to account for this outcome.200 
The quest for a thorough understanding of the process, the re-
sults, and the relationship between the two factors, continues on a 
large scale consistent with China’s vast size and enormous economic 
and political importance. In addition to the seemingly successful out-
come, the uniqueness of the strategy adopted or process followed on 
several fronts is consistently highlighted. This seems to be a fascinat-
ing social experiment with distinct “Chinese characteristics.” The on-
the-face-of-it contradictory, but perhaps entirely logical, patterns ob-
served in the crucial regulatory domain are commonly approached 
from a similar perspective. Indeed, it is argued that, as an assertive 
“rule maker” in the global arena, rather than merely a docile “rule 
taker,” China is inevitably beginning to “export” its particular brand 
of economic regulation.201  
If that is the case, fully grasping the essence of the modus operandi 
of the Chinese regulatory State is an even more vital intellectual task 
than typically assumed. The position taken in this paper is that, de-
spite the substantial headway made, the insights generated fall short 
of providing a comprehensive picture in terms of description, expla-
nation, and critical appraisal. The scholarly output produced by so-
cio-legal scholars conducting research in this field may legitimately 
be regarded as work in progress. Analytical ambiguities and gaps per-
sist, hampering effective diagnosis and prognosis. This is not just a 
matter of undertaking wider exploration, but also seeking better inte-
gration of mainstream and non-mainstream empirical material, as 
well as information garnered from complementary economic and so-
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cial policy sources, and learning from the experience of “early indus-
trializers” in East Asia. 
  
 BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 27 
184 
 
